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INTRODUCTION 
Two significant communication-related events marked our entry into the decade of the 
1980s: 1) the development of personal computing and 2) the introduction of digital 
networking. Both are the consequence of engineering developments which have been 
realized only very recently--towards the middle of the previous decade in fact. 
Personal computing has meant the substitution of digital technology for analogue in a 
variety of office machines. For people who do document-based work of various kinds 
in their daily tasks this evolution implies two improvements: a very considerable 
upgrading of their capacity to handle symbolic material, and the availability of a 
multipurpose tool in place of the previously unifunctional implements they were used 
to. Digital word processors are more flexible, more powerful and cheaper than 
typewriters; electronic "spreadsheets" constitute a dramatic improvement over me- 
chanical calculators; and the graphics capability of personal computers puts design 
techniques that had previously been restricted to the trained technician at the disposal 
of ordinary people. And the magic of software, in combination with microprocessing, 
meant they could all be combined into one compact, cheap machine. The newly 
integrated network, on the other hand, exploiting as it does digital transmission and 
switching, meant that telephones for voice traffic could be merged indiscriminately 
into the same system that handles data, words and pictures (the most common 
application now on the market being the omnipresent fax machine). By the end of the 
1970s, the cumulative effect of these inventions had excited management consultants 
with their potential for the transformation of office work. Phrases such as "office of 
the future", "office automation", the "paperless office", the "integrated electronic 
office", la "bureautique", among others, were on everybody's lips at the dawn of the 
new decade. 
Those who promoted the new technologies of communication reasoned by 
analogy: better tools forthe manufactureand distribution ofphysical goods had brought 
about immense increases in productivity earlier in the century; was it not reasonable 
to posit similarly dramatic effects in the handling of symbolic material within the 
office? The gap between investment in equipment for the plant floor and for the office 
was known to be considerable: would not the new technology redress the imbalance 
and enhance the productivity of what was coming to be known as "knowledge work" 
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(or "information work") by a proportion similar to that of the assembly line? The big 
computer companies, the prospect of a huge profit windfall dancing before their eyes, 
were not slow to advertise "productivity gains" of lo%, 20%, 30%, 40%-the sky 
seemed to be the limit. After all, computing had already proved its worth for typical 
"back office" functions such as accounting, billing, payrolls; was it not reasonable to 
expect similar results from the front office, where the managers worked? 
For those less euphoric in their expectations, office automation held out a different 
prospect: unemployment, dehumanization of the workplace and discrimination. 
Very few of these expectations came to pass in the ensuing years, at least neither 
in the black-and-white terms of the enthusiasts nor of the Cassandras. 
Office automation, only a half decade later, was looking more bust than boom? 
Towards the middle of the 1980s, Paul Strassman, a former vice-president of one 
of the larger high-tech f m s ,  Xerox, began to produce evidence, based on sectoral 
studies, to show that there is no consistent, across-the-board relationship between the 
level of investment in computerization and company productivity (Strassman, 1985). 
The next shock to hit the business community was a cover story in Fortune Magazine 
(May 26,1986) entitled: "The puny payofffrom ofice computers: Business has spent 
billions, but white-collar productivity hasn't budged ". The article was based on an 
analysis conducted by an economist, Stephen Roach (1987), employed by the New 
Yorkinvestment house, Morgan Stanley. Roach's particular achievement was to break 
down (by a "heroic amount of work", according to Fortune ) statistics on the produc- 
tivity of the entire work force by sorting the white-collar occupations from the blue- 
collar. When he hadcompleted his task, he discovered that: (1) blue-collar productivity 
had continued to climb in the United States, while white-collar productivity was (at 
best) stagnant and (at worst) declining, precisely at the time when (2) capital 
investment for white-collar information workers had swept past that for assembly line 
production workers. In the 1960s, the endowment in an industrial worker was twice 
that for the information worker; by 1983, parity was achieved; since then, capital 
investment in the latter exceeds that in the former. Since the proportion of those 
classified as information workers in his analysis is in excess of 65% of the workforce, 
the flatness, or decline, of productivity of this sector constitutes a permanent drag on 
the economy. 
The evidence continued to pile up. An analysis conducted at MIT concluded that 
while the productivity of shop workers had gone up by 13% between 1978 and 1986, 
ofice productivity had gone down by 10% (at the same time as the number of those 
employed in white-collar jobs kept on climbing upward). In an October 1986 article 
in the prestigious journal of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 
Science, Martin Neil Baily of the Brookings Institute in Washington also observed the 
lack of payoff of the new information processing and communication technologies in 
spite of high levels of investment "Zt appears as if the administrative bureaucracies 
of the economy absorbed a large share of total investment without making correspon- 
ding improvements in eficiency " (Baily, 1986). 
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By June of 1987, the New York Times, using U.S. federal Labor Department 
statistics, was led to conclude in its business section that: "Nearly a generation after 
American technology companies unleashed new computers, telecommunications gear 
and electronic equipment, executives and employees are discovering that instead of 
saving labor, the sophisticated machines in many case have been hampering their 
work" (Schneider, 1987). In their breakdown of the figures, the analysts found the 
service sector to be most affected: the average rate of growth in the productivity of 
businesses that do not produce goods has fallen to more than a third of what it was 
before the advent of computer and electronic technology in the early 1970s. Since 
service businesses provide 68% of the GNP and 7 1 % of all jobs, and are expected to 
generate a majority of jobs and wealth in the future, this feeble performance was seen 
to be a matter of considerable concern. 
A shortfall of this size, compared with the initial expectations, and given the vast 
sums being invested (upwards of $5 billion a year in Canada alone by 1985), surely 
needed explaining. Unfortunately, social scientists were not initially very well 
prepared to meet this latter challenge. For one thing, researchers preoccupied with 
organizational phenomena were not much accustomed to conceptualizing what they 
studied through the lens of a model of communication: the physical side of commu- 
nication, to a management scientist, is a lower-level support function, more associated 
with secretary preoccupations than high policy. The burgeoning new field of 
organizational communication had only become identified as a distinct area of inquiry 
a scant ten years or so earlier and even its main thrust was to examine social relations; 
it had little concern with the technology of communication. On the other hand, media 
studies, although very well developed by the early 1980s, were concentrated on mass 
media. The office automation phenomenon, by contrast, was concerned with inter- 
personal and group media. It was therefore not at all clear how to transfer models of 
investigation appropriate to the study of television, radio and film to provide an 
explanation of the curious pattern of media usage now beginning to emerge in the 
office. At the simplest level, there was the elementary question of how to collect data, 
since organizations seldom incorporate follow-up research on their own initiative to 
track the history of an implementation of office technology, and tend not to be 
particularly welcoming of social scientists coming from the outside who might be 
prepared to do so. 
The articles contained in this issue of the Canadian Journal of Communication go 
some direction towards rectifying this situation. Collectively, they report on a variety 
of experiences with the introduction of new technology into office work and begin to 
address the task of formulating a theoretical framework which would explain the initial 
sub-performance of the technology. 
The article by Clark, Dechman and Snider, for example, is one product of an 
ambitious assessment, carried on over a three-year period, of a field trial conducted 
within a branch of the Canadian Department of Communication. Here there was a close 
collaboration between administrators and researchers, and the result is a unique body 
of data, from within a bureaucratic context, where it was possible to isolate some of the 
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main effects of implementation (assuming the latter to be a sociotechnical, and not a 
strictly technical, development). In their article, the authors explore a hypothesis that 
the present author had put forward earlier which predicts that increases in individual 
productivity do not necessarily get translated into better organizational performance. 
Their findings are in conformity with a growing conviction in management circles that 
computerization without organizational restructuring is unlikely to bring about lasting 
benefits. They also point out an inherent difficulty in measuring productivity, and thus 
suggest why standard accounting procedures may have dysfunctional implications for 
the planning of change. 
Lorna Marsden, in her conmbution to this issue, is concerned with a very different 
milieu of work, that of the small office, with only a handful of employees. Her research 
documents some of the human dynamics inherent in computerization. She effectively 
points out the gap between rhetoric and reality: what the boss doesn't know is that the 
system he has bought (without consultation) only works as well as it appears to because 
one of his employees has taken on the burden, at the cost of a personal sacrifice, of 
making it seem to work. This research also illustrates how sexual politics gets involved 
with technical performance, and reminds us that women, in the form of secretaries and 
receptionists, have over the years been the interface between their male employers and 
the technology of communication on which they depended. When it comes to buying 
the new system though, they are likely to be the last to be consulted. 
The article by Belanger, Lafrance and Taylor is set within a different context, that 
of a network of retailing franchises. In their paper, they set out to document how the 
history of an organization, its culture and its political equilibrium can have a deter- 
mining influence on the pattern of implementation. Their work also points out the very 
considerable gulf that exists in many organizations between company officers, with 
little knowledge or understanding of communication technologies, and the services set 
up to take care of the planning and management of the systems. Their work indirectly 
suggests why so many implementation schemes take so much time to effect. 
Andre: Billette pursues the theme of corporate culture even further. In his paper, 
he compares the dynamics of implementation of two banks, each with a very distinct 
style and philosophy of management. His analysis emphasizes the ideological 
dimension of computerization by showing what happens when the goals of imple- 
mentation are at variance with well-established corporate values. Here rhetoric and 
reality are in danger of diverging totally. 
Irving and Weiermair's paper is more theoretical in orientation: it examines the 
theme of reality construction, implicit in Billette's paper, from a more abstract 
perspective. 
Finally, Dufresne and Blais report on the implementation of technology in a small 
business and its effects on office performance and interpersonal dynamics. 
The issue also includes three commentaries: Carney considers word processing 
from a unique perspective, that of the addictive organization; Halary takes a 
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATIONIVol.15 No314 
speculative look at the world-wide growth of networks, and their meaning for the 
distribution of power, Harries-Jones examines some of the implications of the 
commoditization of knowledge, with particular reference to the place of the univer- 
sities, leading him in turn to reflect on the role of interest groups in politics, from within 
a Batesonian perspective. 
Nobody doubts that the new communication technologies are here to stay, nor that 
many benefits flow from them. It has become clear, however, that in and of themselves 
the technologies have no enduring value. The kind of research reported in this issue 
will hopefully point the way to how to do a better job of introducing an inevitable 
change in a way that makes both human and economic sense. Organizational 
communication research is a rapidly growing field in Canada. The articles which 
appear here are helpful in suggesting why it is likely to be a significant force in future 
research. 
James R. Taylor, 
Universid de MontrU 
ENDNOTES 
1. While the references which follow have all been drawn from American sources, 
there is no reason to doubt that they apply equally well to the Canadian situation. 
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